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I. INTRODUCTION
What is the relationship between the First Amendment right
to expressive association and the Fourteenth Amendment right to
vote? It’s closer than you probably think. The Supreme Court employs a balancing test in constitutional challenges to a wide variety of
election practices, including ballot access rules, blanket primaries,
and voter identification. This standard is commonly referred to as
“Anderson-Burdick” for the two main cases from which it derives,
Anderson v. Celebrezze1 and Burdick v. Takushi.2 Recent lower court
decisions have applied this test in constitutional challenges to state
laws restricting same day registration,3 provisional voting,4 and early
voting.5
The Anderson-Burdick standard is the offspring of a union between the Fourteenth Amendment right to vote and the First
Amendment right of association.6 This Article explores the origins,
development, and subsequent obscuration of the relationship between these two rights. It argues for a renewed recognition of the voting–association link when it comes to the burdens on voting challenged in the current generation of voting rights litigation.
Central to this story are two opinions by Justice John Paul Stevens, one written early in his tenure on the Supreme Court and the
other near the end. The first opinion is Anderson, a challenge to ballot access restrictions that were used to exclude independent candidate John Anderson from Ohio’s 1980 presidential ballot. Anderson
 Charles W. Ebersold and Florence Whitcomb Ebersold Professor of Constitutional
Law, The Ohio State University, Moritz College of Law. The author thanks Rebecca Barnard and Hayden Capace for their research assistance.
1. 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
2. 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
3. League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224 (4th Cir. 2014),
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1735 (2015) (mem.); Ohio State Conference of the NAACP v.
Husted, 768 F.3d 524 (6th Cir. 2014), stay granted, 135 S. Ct. 42 (2014) (mem.).
4. Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. Husted, 696 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 2012).
5. Obama for Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423 (6th Cir. 2012).
6. This Article addresses the relationship between voting and the right to expressive
association, not to be confused with the very different right to intimate association. See
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984) (distinguishing the two rights).
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and his supporters brought a hybrid claim, asserting both First
Amendment associational rights and Fourteenth Amendment equal
protection rights.7 The Court struck down Ohio’s ballot access restrictions, citing the risk of discrimination “against those candidates
and—of particular importance—against those voters whose political
preferences lie outside the existing political parties.”8 The Court thus
suggested that restrictions on voting implicate First Amendment associational rights, insofar as it involves individual voters joining together with like-minded others as well as with political parties representing their views.
A quarter-century later, in Crawford v. Marion County Election
Board,9 the Court upheld Indiana’s voter ID law against a facial challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Stevens’ lead opinion adopts the balancing test articulated in Anderson and refined in
Burdick to alleged burdens on voting.10 The dissenting Justices applied the same standard but reached a different conclusion. Since
Crawford, lower courts have consistently used this standard in constitutional challenges to a wide variety election administration practices. But as in Crawford, plaintiffs have based their claims primarily
on the Equal Protection Clause and not the First Amendment, despite the Anderson-Burdick standard’s roots in the right of expressive
association.11
This Article urges recovery of the lost linkage between the First
Amendment right of expressive association and the Fourteenth
Amendment right to vote. Voting restrictions implicate expressive
association to the extent they prevent voters from joining together
with like-minded voters, candidates, and political parties. The First
Amendment provides an appropriate vehicle for voting claims because it acknowledges the risk that the party in power will abuse its
authority to impede association by voters favoring its rival. By affirming the centrality of intermediary organizations—especially political parties—the right of association affirms a decidedly pluralist
perspective in democracy.12
Reviving the voting-association link would cast recent election
administration cases, including Crawford and its lower-court progeny, in a different light—one that more accurately reflects the realworld dynamic in these cases. Disputes over voting rules are not
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 783 (1983).
Id. at 793-94.
553 U.S. 181 (2008).
Id. at 189-91.
See infra Part II.
For an elaboration of this perspective, see generally BRUCE E. CAIN, DEMOCRACY
MORE OR LESS: AMERICA’S POLITICAL REFORM QUANDARY (2015).
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simply or even mainly about an individual’s right to cast a ballot
without impediment. They are better understood as inter-party disputes, in which political insiders seek to block political outsiders from
aggregating their votes so as to challenge the dominant group. Like
the seminal First Amendment association cases of the McCarthy and
civil rights eras, recent voting controversies center on the risk that
those in power will suppress groups challenging that power—be it
the Communist Party in the 1950s, the NAACP in the 1960s, independent-minded voters in 1980, or Democrats in Texas today. Viewing the right of association as a component of the right to vote allows
us to understand the constitutional problems inherent when political
insiders manipulate election rules to stymie those collectively seeking
to challenge their power.
This Article is not the first to suggest a link between the First
Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment right to vote. Abner
Greene,13 Lori Ringhand,14 and Janai Nelson15 are among those who
have written on the subject, as have I.16 But most previous scholarship on the subject focuses on free speech rather than association.
The leading exception is Guy Charles who thoroughly explored the
relationship between voting and associational rights in a 2003 article.17 My account differs from his in two respects. First, Professor
Charles understood the Anderson line of cases as resting on the First
Amendment right of association instead of the Equal Protection
Clause. I view equal protection and association as mutually reinforcing. Second, Professor Charles emphasized racial association, while
this Article sees political parties as the central association in contemporary politics and the constitutional law of elections.18
What are the implications of recognizing that voting is a form of
association protected by the First Amendment? Reconnecting voting
and association would reframe the central issue in future constitutional litigation. It would thus lead to a sharpened understanding of
13. See ABNER GREENE, UNDERSTANDING THE 2000 ELECTION: A GUIDE TO THE LEGAL
BATTLES THAT DECIDED THE PRESIDENCY 132-33 (2001); Abner S. Greene, Is There a First
Amendment Defense for Bush v. Gore?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1643 (2005).
14. See Lori A. Ringhand, Voter Viewpoint Discrimination: A First Amendment Challenge to Voter Participation Restrictions, 13 ELECTION L.J. 288 (2014).
15. See Janai S. Nelson, The First Amendment, Equal Protection, and Felon Disenfranchisement: A New Viewpoint, 65 FLA. L. REV. 111 (2013).
16. See Daniel P. Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection: On Discretion, Inequality, and Participation, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2409, 2410 (2003).
17. Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Racial Identity, Electoral Structures, and the First Amendment Right of Association, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1209 (2003).
18. Dan Lowenstein also addressed associational rights in an excellent article written
more than two decades ago, although his focus was on then-recent decisions according
associational rights to political parties. Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Associational Rights of
Major Political Parties: A Skeptical Inquiry, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1741 (1993). I address Professor Lowenstein’s views in Part III, infra.
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the injury that the now ubiquitous Anderson-Burdick standard is designed to prevent. The State would have a heavier burden of justification to the extent that election rules have the effect of discriminating against voters supporting the opposing party. Associational rights
provide an appropriate vehicle for understanding voting injuries, including not only ballot access and blanket primary issues to which
the First Amendment has traditionally been deployed, but also election administration controversies to which it has not. Future litigants
challenging burdens on voting should therefore add the First
Amendment association claims to their arsenal. Doing so would hone
in on the real injury in the current generation of voter ID, early voting, provisional voting, and voter registration cases: preventing nondominant political parties and their supporters from challenging the
party in power.
Part II of this Article traces the roots of the First Amendment
right to expressive association, starting with the mid-century cases
involving the NAACP and Communist Party and proceeding through
later decisions involving compelled association and campaign finance
regulation. Part III examines the relationship between voting and
the associational rights through a close analysis of cases connecting
these two rights, as well as more recent cases that overlook this connection. Part IV proposes the re-linking of voting and associational
rights, arguing for a refinement of the Anderson-Burdick doctrine to
focus on the disparate impact on non-dominant parties, and tracing
how this refinement would play out in constitutional challenges to
present-day voting restrictions.
II. THE ROOTS OF EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION
One of the leading statements of the core value underlying the
First Amendment appears in Justice Thurgood Marshall’s opinion for
the Court in Police Department v. Mosley.19 “[A]bove all else,” he
wrote, “the First Amendment means that government has no power
to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject
matter, or its content.”20 The Court has reiterated this admonition
many times, doubling down on it in recent First Amendment cases.21
As Justice Scalia put it in one of his last dissents: “[T]he First

19. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
20. Id. at 95. For the leading scholarly exposition of this idea, see Kenneth L. Karst,
Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20, 26-29 (1975)
(discussing Mosley); see also Geoffrey R. Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places,
1974 SUP. CT. REV. 233, 273-80 (discussing Mosley). I have expounded on the centrality of
equality under the First Amendment at length. See Tokaji, supra note 16.
21. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015) (showing contentdiscriminatory sign regulations are subject to strict scrutiny).
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Amendment is a kind of Equal Protection Clause for ideas.”22 It
guards against government officials misusing their power to suppress
points of view they disfavor. Most conspicuously, it prevents the dominant political group from trying to silence dissident groups that
threaten its grip on power.
This conception of the First Amendment finds its most fulsome
expression in the decisions in which the Supreme Court developed
the right of association. From its beginnings, the main beneficiaries
of this right have been groups advancing a political viewpoint contrary to that espoused by the powers-that-be.23 The Supreme Court developed the First Amendment right of association in a series of midcentury cases, most of them arising from governmental interference
with two types of groups.
One line of cases involves the NAACP and other groups advocating for civil rights in the South. The first and most important of these
decisions was NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson.24 An Alabama
court had cited the NAACP for contempt after it refused to comply
with an order that the group disclose its members in accordance with
state law.25 In holding that the NAACP had a First Amendment right
to resist disclosure, Justice Harlan wrote for the Court:
Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association, as this Court has more than once recognized by remarking
upon the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly. It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for
the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of
the “liberty” assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.26

Compelled disclosure of the NAACP’s members, the Court concluded, would paralyze its attempt to advocate for racial justice. This
was an entirely realistic appraisal at the time, when threats and
22. Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1680 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
23. There is a rich body of scholarly literature exploring the theory and doctrine of the
First Amendment right to expressive association. For some leading examples, see Ashutosh
Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 978, 981 (2011); Victor Brudney, Association,
Advocacy, and the First Amendment, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1 (1995); Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine Fisk, The Expressive Interest of Associations, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
595 (2001); Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Friends, Associates, and Associations: Theoretically and
Empirically Grounding the Freedom of Association, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 53 (2014); William P.
Marshall, Discrimination and the Right of Association, 81 NW. U. L. REV. 68 (1986); Jason
Mazzone, Freedom’s Associations, 77 WASH. L. REV. 639, 645 (2002). I do not address most
of this work in this brief Article, since my focus is primarily on the relationship between
the rights of association and voting.
24. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
25. Id. at 451.
26. Id. at 460 (citations omitted).
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violence against those involved in the civil rights movement were
routine in places like Alabama. Decisions following NAACP v. Alabama alarmingly gave like protection from disclosure to other civil
rights groups and their members.27
The other seminal line of expressive association cases involves
the Communist Party and its members. Around the same time as
the NAACP compelled disclosure cases, the Court decided two cases
arising from convictions of Communist Party members. In Scales v.
United States,28 the Court upheld the conviction of a district chairman who not only knew of its illegal activities but also “specifically
intend[ed] to accomplish [the aims of the organization] by resort to
violence.”29 By contrast, in Noto v. United States,30 the Court reversed
a conviction of a party member whose specific intent to further illegal
activities had not been proven. The upshot was that mere association
with a political party, despite its illegal aims, was insufficient to convict. Later cases expanded this protection beyond criminal cases,
prohibiting the denial of other benefits such as employment31 or bar
membership32 based on party membership alone. These cases thus
prevent the government from imposing either criminal penalties or
other sanctions based on one’s dissident political views absent evidence of an intent to promote illegal activity. The chief concern is
that government-targeting of unpopular groups would discourage
people from joining, thus impoverishing public debate.
Other cases extend protection to people associating as a way to
advance their political beliefs through litigation. In this area, too, the
groundbreaking case arose from the civil rights movement. In
NAACP v. Button,33 the Court struck down a Virginia law prohibiting
lawyers from soliciting prospective clients, which had been used to
stop the NAACP’s efforts to organize civil rights lawsuits. Justice
Brennan’s opinion for the Court held that the litigation, in which the
NAACP sought to engage, was not just a means of resolving private
27. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); see also Gibson v. Fla. Legislative
Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963) (holding that petitioner’s conviction for failing to
release information contained in the membership was a violation of the right of association
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments).
28. 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
29. Id. at 229 (second alteration in original) (quotation omitted).
30. 367 U.S. 290 (1961).
31. See United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385
U.S. 589 (1967); see also Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966) (rejecting loyalty oath and
prohibition on Communist Party membership for officeholders).
32. See Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1 (1971); In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23 (1971).
But see Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154 (1971)
(upholding a bar question asking whether applicants had joined a group knowing of its
objective to overthrow the government by violence and, if so, whether they had specific
intent to advance those ends).
33. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
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disputes but also “a form of political expression.”34 While recognizing
that the NAACP was “not a conventional political party,” its litigation sought to advance the collective interests of the African American community.35 Virginia’s law thus infringed upon the associational
rights of the NAACP, as well as its members and its lawyers. Later
cases extended this protection to other groups engaged in impact litigation such as labor unions36 and advocates for reproductive rights.37
The unifying theme is that the State may not prevent people from
associating in pursuit of ideological goals through litigation.
The freedom to associate in pursuit of shared political goals sometimes includes the freedom not to associate as well. An example is
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, in which the Court held that
public employees could not be compelled to support a labor union’s
ideological activities, though they could be required to pay for the union’s collective bargaining services.38 The First Amendment’s protection against compelled association is not, however, absolute. In Roberts v. United States Jaycees,39 the Court held that the First Amendment’s protections did not extend to a private club’s exclusion of
women, which was a violation of a state civil rights statute, because
the admission of women would do no discernible damage to the club’s
expressive aims.40 On the other hand, the Court struck down the application of a state law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale.41 The Court accepted the Boy Scouts’ claim that accepting gays would undermine its
antigay message and, accordingly, infringe on its right to expressive
association.42 The right to be free from compelled association thus
34. Id. at 429.
35. Id. at 431.
36. See United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576 (1971); United Mine
Workers, Dist. 12 v. Ill. State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
37. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978). On the other hand, the same day it handed
down Primus, the Court held in another case that states may prohibit solicitation of purely
commercial offers of legal assistance. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
38. 431 U.S. 209 (1977); see also Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1990)
(finding that the bar association may require members to pay fees used for regulation of
the profession, but not political advocacy). In recent years, the Roberts Court has extended
the protection against compelled association further, requiring that workers “opt in” to
support certain union political activities rather than allowing unions to charge them for
such activities unless they “opt out.” Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S.
Ct. 2277, 2293 (2012). Currently before the Court is another First Amendment challenge to
compelled support for a union’s collective bargaining services. Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers
Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 2933 (2015) (granting certiorari petition).
39. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
40. Id. at 626-27.
41. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
42. Id. at 648, 651; see also Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Grp. of Bos.,
515 U.S. 557 (1995) (holding that a private group organizing a St. Patrick’s Day parade
had a right to exclude a group with an antithetical message).
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extends only to those whose participation would interfere with the
group’s message.43 As with other cases involving associational rights,
the central question in the compelled association cases is whether
state action has impeded a group’s ability to express its ideological
perspective.
Similar concerns are at play in cases involving campaign finance
regulation, an area worthy of special note given its close connection
to voting. Two aspects of campaign finance law implicate expressive
association. The first is restrictions on political contributions, which
Buckley v. Valeo44 famously distinguished from restrictions on expenditures. While restrictions on the latter directly impede political
speech, the Court reasoned, contribution limits are only a “marginal”
restriction on speech.45 Buckley viewed contribution limits as mainly
affecting association, rather than speech,46 and thus warranting less
searching scrutiny than expenditure limits.47 The other aspect of
campaign finance law implicating associational rights is compelled
disclosure of campaign contributions and expenditures. Since Buckley, the Supreme Court has recognized that mandatory disclosure has
the potential to chill would-be donors and spenders, subjecting such
requirements to “exacting scrutiny.”48 While generally upholding disclosure requirements,49 the Court has recognized the need to accommodate groups and individuals that may suffer retaliation if contributions are made public.50 Accordingly, it has held that individuals
and groups may claim an exception where there is a “reasonable
probability” that compelled disclosure will lead to threats, harassment, or reprisals.51 Following NAACP v. Alabama, this test is
grounded in recognition that compelled disclosure can paralyze non-

43. Another example is California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000),
discussed infra note 104.
44. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
45. Id. at 20-21.
46. Id. at 24-25 (“[T]he primary First Amendment problem raised by the [Federal
Election Campaign] Act’s contribution limitations is their restriction of one aspect of the
contributor’s freedom of political association.”).
47. Id. at 25. Although Buckley itself is imprecise regarding the level of scrutiny, the
Court later clarified that contribution limits need only be “closely drawn” to an important
interest, while expenditure limits must satisfy strict scrutiny and be narrowly tailored to a
compelling interest. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1445 (2014); McConnell v.
FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 386-88 (2000).
48. 424 U.S. at 64.
49. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 93.
50. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 70-71.
51. Id. at 74. The Court later found this test satisfied in Brown v. Socialist Workers
’74 Campaign Committee, 459 U.S. 87, 98-101 (1982). More recently, the Court has applied
the same test to compelled disclosure of referendum signatories. Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186,
200-01 (2010).
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mainstream political groups, whose fundraising and therefore expression may be stymied if their supporters’ identities are publicized.
Thus far, I have focused on cases that involve political association
but do not directly concern the act of voting. There is, however, another line of cases in which the Court has extended the right of expressive association to voters, candidates, and parties joining together at the ballot box. Part III discusses those cases.
III. ASSOCIATION AND THE VOTE
The Supreme Court has long flirted with the idea that voting is a
form of speech protected by the First Amendment, but has never
adopted this position. It has, however, held that voting is a form of
expressive association protected by the First Amendment.
Before exploring the connection between voting and association, it
is worth considering the road not taken. The Court entertained the
argument that voting was protected speech in Harper v. Virginia
Board of Elections52 but wound up striking down the poll tax based
solely on the fundamental right to vote under the Fourteenth
Amendment.53 Justice Douglas’ opinion for the Court in Harper observed that “[w]ealth, like race, creed, or color, is not germane to
one’s ability to participate intelligently in the electoral process.”54 By
denying the vote to citizens unable to pay the $1.50 poll tax, Virginia
was effectively discriminating against poor people in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause. The Harper plaintiffs argued that voting is
speech protected by the First Amendment, but the Court declined to
rule on that ground.55 Nor has it since then, though some Justices
have occasionally toyed with the possibility.56 The Court’s closest
brush with the idea since then was Bush v. Gore.57 That opinion
silently borrows from First Amendment cases, looking with suspicion
52. 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966). For discussion of the drafting history of Harper, see
RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW: JUDGING EQUALITY FROM
BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH V. GORE 36-38 (2003).
53. Harper, 383 U.S. at 665-70; see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964)
(holding that restrictions on voting must be “carefully and meticulously scrutinized”
because the right to vote is fundamental); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)
(holding that voting is “a fundamental political right, because preservative [sic] of all
rights”).
54. 383 U.S. at 668; accord id. at 665.
55. Id. at 665.
56. Most notable is Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Vieth v. Jubelirer, in
which he suggests that challenges to partisan gerrymandering might be grounded in the
First Amendment. 541 U.S. 267, 314-17 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring). This decision is
addressed infra Part IV.
57. 531 U.S. 98 (2000); see also Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 425 & n.52
(2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing legal scholarship for the proposition that “voting is,
among other things, a form of speech”).
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on schemes given to government officials to regulate speech,58 but
ultimately rested—at least explicitly—on the right to vote under the
Equal Protection Clause.59
While not viewing voting as speech, the Court has, for decades,
held that some aspects of voting are protected forms of association
under the First Amendment. The first case to recognize the votingassociation link was Williams v. Rhodes,60 decided two years after
Harper. Williams involved a challenge to Ohio’s requirement that
new political parties file petition signatures, equal to fifteen percent
of the ballots cast in the last gubernatorial election, by February in
order to get on the presidential ballot.61 This restriction was challenged
by the American Independent Party and the Socialist Labor Party.62
In striking down Ohio’s restrictions, Justice Black’s opinion for the
Court relied on both the Equal Protection Clause and the First
Amendment. The Court cited the NAACP and Communist Party decisions on freedom of association, extending their principle to state
laws restricting political parties’ access to the ballot.63 The problem,
according to the opinion, was that the law advantaged political insiders over outsiders, “giv[ing] the two old, established parties a decided
advantage over any new parties . . . and thus plac[ing] substantially
unequal burdens on both the right to vote and the right to associate.”64 The Court thus required the State to provide a compelling interest justifying its restriction and then proceeded to reject the
State’s proffered justifications.65 Most significantly, it rejected the
stated interest in favoring a two-party system on the ground that
Ohio’s law went further, “favor[ing] two particular parties—the Republicans and the Democrats—and in effect tends to give them a
complete monopoly.”66 Without a sufficient interest to justify the law,
Ohio’s ballot access restriction was held to impose an impermissible
burden on voting and associational rights.67
58. Tokaji, supra note 16, at 2487-95; see also GREENE, supra note 13, at 132-33
(discussing the suspicion of public officials discretion and the uncited First Amendment
line of cases in Bush v. Gore). The Court has also considered the very different question of
whether a legislator’s vote is speech protected by the First Amendment, holding it is not.
Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. 2343, 2350-51 (2011).
59. Bush, 531 U.S. at 104-05.
60. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
61. Id. at 24-27.
62. Id. at 26.
63. Id. at 30, 31.
64. Id. at 31.
65. Id. at 31-34.
66. Id. at 32.
67. Id. at 34. The Court proceeded to hold that the Independent Party was entitled to
be placed on the ballot, but not the Socialist Labor Party, which had asked to be added to
the ballot later, on the ground that this relief would be too disruptive. Id. at 34-35. Justice
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Williams was an important step forward in two respects. First, it
explicitly recognized the link between the First Amendment right of
expressive association and the Fourteenth Amendment right to vote.
Second, Williams involved a positive claim to get something from the
government, rather than a negative claim to be left alone. Most earlier cases involved the State’s unwanted government intrusion on the
affected group’s liberty interest—for example, the government seeking a membership list in NAACP v. Alabama or restricting solicitation of clients in NAACP v. Button. By contrast, the Williams plaintiffs were demanding something from the State: a place on the ballot.
That said, Williams is not as much of an extension of precedent as it
might first appear. Some of the Communist Party cases likewise involved an affirmative claim to something from the government—a job
or, later, admission to the bar—that was denied on account of party
affiliation. There is still a difference, however, in that these benefits
were expressly denied on account of belief or association in the earlier cases. By contrast, Williams relied on the practical effect of the
State’s restrictions on non-dominant political parties and their
supporters.
Subsequent cases follow Williams in affirming the link between
voting and association, while qualifying both rights. The Court would
go on to uphold some restrictions on third party and independent
candidates’ access to the ballot, such as reasonable signature and
disaffiliation requirements.68 In other cases, it invalidated rules that
imposed too great a burden on would-be voters or candidates, especially those seeking to challenge the two major parties’ grip on power.69 For example, in Kusper v. Pontikes, the Court struck down a requirement that voters be disaffiliated from one party for at least
twenty-three months before voting in the primary of another, finding
it too great a restriction on voters associating with the party of their

Douglas concurred, emphasizing the harm to dissident political parties from Ohio’s rule,
but would have granted relief to the Socialist Labor Party as well. Id. at 35-41 (Douglas, J.,
concurring). Justice Harlan concurred in the judgment, grounding his reasoning in the
First Amendment and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Equal
Protection Clause. Id. at 41-48 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Stewart and Chief Justice
Warren dissented. Id. at 48 (Stewart, J., dissenting); id. at 63 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
68. See generally Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974) (upholding the requirement
that candidates be disaffiliated from political parties for a year before running as independents); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971) (upholding the requirement that third
party and independent candidates obtain signatures from five percent of registered voters).
69. See e.g., Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979)
(striking down a requirement that new parties and independent candidates in Chicago
obtain at least 25,000 petition signatures); Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974) (striking
down a $701.60 filing fee where there was no alternative means of getting on the primary
ballot); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) (striking down filing fees as high as $8900 to
get on the primary ballot).
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choice.70 Some of these cases emphasize equal protection, others freedom of association, but none of them question the link between these
rights that Williams recognized.
A critical development in the law of voting and association was
Justice Stevens’ opinion for the Court in Anderson, another challenge
to Ohio ballot access rules. A state statute required that independent
presidential candidates file papers in late March, seventy-five days
before the primary election and more than seven months before the
general election.71 The plaintiffs were John Anderson, an independent candidate for President in 1980, and three voters supporting
his candidacy.72
Justice Stevens’ opinion in Anderson solidifies and develops the
link between voting and association. Because “a candidate serves as a
rallying-point for like-minded citizens,” Justice Stevens wrote, restrictions on ballot access may hinder voters’ freedom to associate
with both candidates of their choice and one another.73 The risk is
particularly great where dominant parties make rules that exclude
independent or minor party candidates. That does not mean that all
state restrictions on ballot access are invalid. The Court reconciled
Williams’ requirement of a compelling interest with the more lenient
standard suggested in later decisions, by articulating a balancing
test. As a practical matter, Justice Stevens’ opinion recognized that
states must impose some regulations on elections. There is accordingly no “litmus-paper test” for separating valid and invalid ones.74
Courts should instead weigh the “character and magnitude” of the
harm to First and Fourteenth Amendment rights against the “precise
interest put forward by the State.”75 While “reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions” are generally justified by the State’s “important
regulatory interests,” stronger government interests are required to
justify more serious burdens, including ones that are discriminatory.76
Anderson’s standard focuses mainly on the impact that the challenged practice has on voters favoring independent or non-dominant
party candidates. At the center of the inquiry is the effect of the challenged practice on those likely to favor political outsiders. The Court
emphasized that it is not just the “magnitude” or the burden but also
its “character”77—or, as stated at the end of the opinion, not just the
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

414 U.S. 51 (1973).
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 782-83 (1983).
Id. at 783.
Id. at 787-88.
Id. at 789.
Id.
Id. at 788.
Id. at 789.
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“extent” of the burden but also its “nature”—that is critical.78 Especially problematic are burdens that “fall[] unequally on new or small
political parties or on independent candidates,” because they “discriminate[] against those candidates and—of particular importance—
against those voters whose political preferences lie outside the existing political parties.”79 This framing puts the challenged practice’s
disparate impact on certain groups at the center of the analysis.
Anderson does not require proof of a discriminatory purpose, though
such evidence would presumably be relevant in illuminating the
character of the burden on voting.
Applying its newly formulated standard, the Court concluded that
Ohio’s early filing deadline had a “substantial impact” on the associational rights of independent-minded voters.80 By requiring independent candidates to file two and one-half months before the state primary, it would bar those driven to enter the fray by developments
occurring during the parties’ nomination process. It therefore threatened to deny an adequate choice to voters disaffected by and dissatisfied with the choices offered by the major parties.81 The Anderson
Court proceeded to find the State’s interests inadequate to justify
this burden. Especially significant is its discussion of Ohio’s asserted
interest in promoting political stability. The Court rejected the idea
that the “desire to protect existing political parties from competition”
could justify restrictions on independent and minor-party candidates’
ballot access.82 Protecting the major parties from competition was not
an acceptable reason for “the virtual exclusion of other political aspirants from the political arena.”83 Ohio’s rule was especially burdensome, the Court recognized, because independent and minor-party
candidates often start as a “dissident group” attempting to exert influence within a major party.84 To exclude them from the general
election ballot through an extremely early filing deadline would deny
such dissident groups any meaningful leverage.
In addition to providing a legal standard, Anderson deepened the
connection between the rights of association and voting that Williams
recognized. The Court expressly grounded its analysis in both, citing
NAACP v. Alabama’s holding that association is a central aspect of
the liberty protected by the First Amendment and Williams’ holding
that voting and associational rights overlap when it comes to ballot
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 806.
Id. at 793-94.
Id. at 790, 795.
Id. at 792.
Id. at 801, 805-06.
Id. at 802.
Id. at 805.
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access.85 And in the concluding paragraph of its opinion, the Court
stressed that its “primary concern was not the interest of candidate
Anderson, but rather, the interests of the voters who chose to associate together to express their support for Anderson’s candidacy
and the views he espouse[s].”86 This statement makes unmistakably
clear that the Court viewed voting as a form of association, for which
Anderson’s supporters collectively enjoyed constitutional protection.
The right that Anderson affirms is best understood as a hybrid,
grounded in both the First Amendment and the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In a footnote citing Williams,
Justice Stevens’ opinion for the Court explained that the Court’s
holding was premised on both the First and Fourteenth Amendments:
In this case, we base our conclusions directly on the First and
Fourteenth Amendments and do not engage in a separate Equal
Protection Clause analysis. We rely, however, on the analysis in a
number of our prior election cases resting on the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. These cases, applying the
“fundamental rights” strand of equal protection analysis, have
identified the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights implicated
by restrictions on the eligibility of voters and candidates, and have
considered the degree to which the State’s restrictions further legitimate state interests.87

Professor Charles understands Anderson to ground the Court’s
analysis in the right of association under the First Amendment
instead of the right to vote under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The better interpretation, in my view, is
that Anderson is grounded in both voting and associational rights.
Here and elsewhere in the opinion, the Court expressly states it is
relying on both the First and Fourteenth Amendments.88 Declining to
engage in a “separate” equal protection analysis is not the same as
rejecting the Equal Protection Clause as a source of the hybrid right
it recognized. To the contrary, the Court elsewhere affirms that ballot
access rules may affect both voting and associational rights. Anderson synthesizes associational and voting rights, rather than replacing
the former with the latter.

85. Id. at 786-87.
86. Id. at 806 (emphasis added).
87. Id. at 786 n.7 (citations omitted).
88. The reference to the Fourteenth Amendment could be understood to refer to the
Due Process Clause, which has long been thought to incorporate the First Amendment.
But, Anderson’s references to the right to vote belie the argument that the Court was backing away from the Equal Protection Clause, the primary textual source of that right. See
also id. at 787 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-31 (1968), for the proposition
that voting and associational rights overlap when it comes to ballot access restrictions).
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The Court refined the Anderson voting-association standard in
Burdick v. Takushi, upholding a challenge to Hawaii’s ban on writein voting.89 Justice White’s opinion for the majority unambiguously
reaffirmed Anderson’s “flexible” standard, reiterating that courts
should weigh the “character and magnitude” of the challenged restriction against the “precise interests put forward by the State.”90 It
also quotes Anderson’s statement that “reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions” may generally be supported by “the State’s important
regulatory interests.”91 Burdick’s main doctrinal contribution is to
clarify that only a restriction that is “severe” should receive strict
scrutiny, requiring government to show it is narrowly tailored to a
compelling interest.92 Finding the State’s prohibition on write-in voting to be “slight” in magnitude and “politically neutral” in character,
Burdick held that the State’s interests in preventing factionalism
and party raiding were sufficient to sustain it.93 While the dissenting
opinion by Justice Kennedy (joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens) thought the burden more serious and the state interests more
modest than the majority,94 the dissent expressly agreed with the
Court’s “careful statement . . . of the test to be applied.”95 Thus, all
nine Justices in Burdick agreed on the constitutional standard.
Other cases apply Anderson’s standard to restrictions on minor
parties’ access to the ballot. While usually exhibiting greater solicitude for the State’s interests, they do not change the standard or the
hybrid nature of the right Anderson recognized. An example is Munro
v. Socialist Workers Party,96 which upheld a state requirement that
minor-party candidates receive at least one percent of primary votes
to appear on the general election ballot. Another is Timmons v. Twin
Cities Area New Party,97 upholding a state ban on “fusion” candidacies. Both cases find the burden on minor parties modest and the

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

504 U.S. 428 (1992).
504 U.S. at 434 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789).
Id. (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788).
Id.
Id. at 438-40.
Id. at 442-50 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 445.
479 U.S. 189, 193-99 (1986).
520 U.S. 351, 356-70 (1997).
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state interests adequate to justify that burden.98 Yet they apply the
same basic framework that the Court adopted in Anderson, reaffirming its fusion of voting and association claims.
The Court would later extend Anderson’s reasoning to disputes
between the major parties. The first and still most important case to
do so was Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut.99 Justice Marshall’s opinion for the Court struck down Connecticut’s prohibition on
independent voters participating in primaries as applied to the state
Republican Party, which had adopted a rule allowing independent
voters to participate in its primary. At the time, Democrats controlled
the state legislature and, in a party-line vote, refused to change state
law to accommodate Republicans’ desire to include independents in
their primary. Applying the Anderson standard, the Court concluded
that the State had imposed an impermissible burden on association.100
Like the minor-party and independent-candidate decisions on
which it builds, Tashjian reflects a concern with a dominant party
seeking to diminish the strength of a rival group.101 Professor Lowenstein has criticized Tashjian, partly on the ground that “the major
parties are grown-ups who, generally speaking, can be expected to
take care of themselves.”102 This may sometimes be true—but not always. After all, the dominant major party is more likely to have its
grip on power threatened by the other major party than by minor
98. Munro defers to the State’s interests in avoiding voter confusion, ballot overcrowding, and frivolous candidacies. Timmons adds the interest in promoting “political stability”
to the list of those that may justify ballot access restrictions. My two casebook co-authors,
Rick Hasen and Dan Lowenstein, have disagreed over the import of Timmons. Professor
Hasen criticizes Timmons for recognizing the preservation of the two-party system as a
legitimate interest. See Richard L. Hasen, Entrenching the Duopoly: Why the Supreme
Court Should Not Allow the States to Protect the Democrats and Republicans from Political
Competition, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 331, 367-71 (1997). Professor Lowenstein’s more sympathetic account is that Timmons affirmed the interest in a healthy two-party system rather
than the promotion of the two-party system (and thus the exclusion of minor parties) per
se. Daniel H. Lowenstein, Legal Regulation and Protection of American Parties, in
HANDBOOK OF PARTY POLITICS 456, 464 (Richard S. Katz & William Crotty eds., 2006).
While the Hasen-Lowenstein disagreement is peripheral to this Article, I agree with Professor Lowenstein’s understanding of Timmons. Whoever is right, Timmons reaffirms
Anderson’s holding that there are limits on the major parties’ authority to restrict independent and minor-party candidates’ ballot access. 520 U.S. at 367 (showing state interest
in stability “does not permit a state to completely insulate the two-party system from minor parties’ or independent candidates’ competition and influence” (citing Anderson v.
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 802 (1983))).
99. 479 U.S. 208 (1986).
100. Id. at 213-25. But see Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581 (2005) (upholding semiclosed primary system under which party members and independent voters could vote in
party primary, but other parties’ members could not).
101. See generally Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643 (1998) (exploring the way
dominant parties limit competition from weaker groups).
102. Lowenstein, supra note 18, at 1790.
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parties or independent candidates. There was certainly a reasonable
argument to be made for uniform rules in Tashjian, as Professor
Lowenstein has observed.103 But there is also good reason for judicial
skepticism, where one major party controls the machinery of government and uses that power to make life difficult for its main
competitor.104
To recap, the Anderson-Burdick standard has been applied in a
wide variety of electoral contexts, including state laws regulating ballot access, restricting write-in voting, and determining who may vote
in party primaries. These cases affirm, explicitly or implicitly, the
link between voting and association recognized in Williams and developed in Anderson. For the most part, the cases in which the Court
has found a violation are ones in which a dominant major party uses
its power to impede association among voters favoring the other major party, minor parties, or independent candidates.
The most recent doctrinal development involves a subject that, at
first glance, seems quite dissimilar to the voting-association cases
detailed above: voter identification. In Crawford v. Marion County
Election Board,105 a majority of Justices applied the AndersonBurdick standard to an Indiana law requiring most voters to present
government-issued photo ID at the polls. Unlike ballot access cases
such as Williams and Anderson, Crawford did not involve a claim
that voters were denied their First Amendment right to associate

103. Id.
104. See, e.g., Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 101, at 654-59. Some later cases involving major-party associational rights are more difficult to justify on this ground. The Court
would later extend Anderson from inter-party to intra-party disputes in Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee, striking down California’s ban on certain party
endorsements and restrictions on internal party governance. 489 U.S. 214, 222-23 (1989).
For a compelling critique of judicial intervention in this case, see Lowenstein, supra note
18, at 1777-87. It is not obvious why judicial intervention is necessary, absent evidence
that one faction of a party has been locked out of its deliberations, as were African Americans from the Texas Democratic Party in the White Primary Cases. See id. at 1748-49. Also
difficult to justify on this ground is the decision in California Democratic Party v. Jones,
530 U.S. 567, 572-86 (2000), striking down a state blanket primary in which non-party
members were allowed to vote in a party primary over the major parties’ objections. In
contrast to Tashjian, this was not a case in which the dominant major party was frustrating voting and association rights of its main competitor. It was instead a dispute among
different factions within the major parties, particularly the Republican Party. See Michael
S. Kang, The Hydraulics and Politics of Party Regulation, 91 IOWA L. REV. 131, 164-65
(2005). In a later case, Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party,
552 U.S. 442, 449-59 (2008), the Court would uphold, against a facial challenge, a different
kind of blanket primary—one in which all candidates appeared on the ballot with their
party affiliation and the top two vote-getters, regardless of party, would proceed to the
general election. This Article leaves to one side the difficult question what role courts
should play in resolving intra-party disputes, a question thoughtfully and comprehensively
addressed—with different answers—in the above articles by Professors Lowenstein and
Kang. My focus here is on disputes between, not within, political parties.
105. 553 U.S. 181, 185-86, 189-91 (2008).
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with a party, candidate, or other voters. The Crawford plaintiffs
grounded their claim solely on the Fourteenth Amendment right to
vote, not the right of association.
The Justices were divided into three groups in Crawford. The narrowest ground for the decision appears in the lead opinion by Justice
Stevens (joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy). His
legal analysis begins by noting that the Court of Appeals distinguished Harper, on the ground that voter ID is relevant to a voter’s
qualifications to vote, while the poll tax was not.106 It proceeds to apply the constitutional standard of Anderson and its progeny, balancing the burden placed on voting against the precise interest put forward by the State.107 According to Justice Stevens, the number of affected voters was “small” and the “magnitude of the burden” uncertain on the record before the Court.108 Although the plaintiffs asserted that Indiana’s law would have a negative effect on indigent voters,
evidence of an excessive burden on them or any other identifiable
class of voters was lacking.109 Given the modest burden on voters, the
State’s claimed interests in fraud prevention, voter confidence, and
election modernization were sufficient to sustain the statute against
a facial challenge.
Under Anderson and the voting-as-association cases that followed,
the central question is the impact of the challenged law on supporters
of a non-dominant party or candidate. Crawford’s discussion of this
point is telling. Justice Stevens’ lead opinion observed that Indiana’s
law was approved on a party-line vote, with Republicans uniformly
supporting it and Democrats uniformly opposing it.110 From this fact,
it could fairly be inferred that partisan considerations played a role
in its passage. But the existence of such motivations—invariably present in any law regulating elections—was insufficient to invalidate
the law on its face. Justice Stevens explained: “[I]f a nondiscriminatory law is supported by valid neutral justifications, those justifications should not be disregarded simply because partisan interests
may have provided one motivation for the votes of individual
legislators.”111
Justice Stevens’ opinion did not explain precisely what was meant
by “nondiscriminatory,” but the context suggests that the negative
effects of the law are paramount. This is consistent with Anderson
and the other cases cited, which focus on the impact that a law has
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 188.
Id. at 189-91.
Id. at 200.
Id. at 202.
Id. at 203.
Id. at 204 (emphasis added).
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on voters favoring non-dominant parties or independent candidacies.
It is also consistent with Justice Stevens’ view in partisan gerrymandering cases, in which he has advocated attention to “whether the
plan has a significant adverse impact on an identifiable political
group.”112 The Crawford record was conspicuously devoid of evidence
that Indiana’s law would have a disproportionate impact on Democrats compared to Republicans.113 The lead opinion suggests that this
omission was a serious one, undercutting the suggestion that Indiana’s law was discriminatory and therefore subject to strict scrutiny.
Justice Scalia’s concurrence (joined by Justices Thomas and Alito)
purported to apply Anderson and Burdick, but read those cases differently. He urged a “two-track approach,” applying strict scrutiny in
cases where there is a severe burden and deferring to the states in
other cases.114 As Justin Levitt has explained, Justice Scalia’s approach is more like a light switch, while that of the other Justices is
more like a dimmer with the State’s burden of justification increasing
with the burden on voters.115 Unlike the lead opinion—as well as the
dissents—Justice Scalia would avoid any judicial inquiry into the
“individual impacts” on voters.116 While this statement might be understood to imply that collective impacts are relevant, it appears that
this group would find a severe burden only in cases where discriminatory intent to disadvantage a particular group is proven.117
Justice Souter’s dissent (joined by Justice Ginsburg) applies the
same standard as Justice Stevens, balancing the “character and
magnitude” of the burden on voting against the “precise interests put
forward by the state.”118 But Justice Souter found the burden on
voters to be more substantial than the majority, focusing especially

112. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 751 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring).
113. 553 U.S. at 200-03.
114. Id. at 204-05 (Scalia, J., concurring).
115. Justin Levitt, Crawford--More Rhetorical Bark Than Legal Bite?, BRENNAN CTR.
FOR JUSTICE (May 2, 2008), http://www.brennancenter.org/blog/crawford-more-rhetoricalbark-legal-bite.
116. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 205 (Scalia, J., concurring).
117. Id. at 207. This position is difficult to square with earlier cases in the Anderson
line, in which the Court struck down restrictions on ballot access without finding an intent
to disadvantage a particular group. A cryptic footnote in Justice Scalia’s opinion suggests
that economic burdens on voting—like the poll tax or filing fees—may warrant heightened
scrutiny even without discriminatory intent. See id. at 207 n.* (“[I]t suffices to note that we
have never held that legislatures must calibrate all election laws, even those totally unrelated to money, for their impacts on poor voters or must otherwise accommodate wealth
disparities.”) (second emphasis added). This does not, however, explain why the Court
struck down ballot access requirements unrelated to money in cases such as Williams and
Anderson. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S.
23 (1968).
118. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 211, 223-24 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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on voter IDs’ effects on indigent voters.119 Justice Breyer’s dissent
applied a similar balancing standard, without expressly relying on
Anderson and Burdick, focusing on the law’s impact on voters who
are poor, elderly, or disabled.120
Despite the absence of a majority opinion, a majority of Justices in
Crawford agreed on two key points. The first is that the constitutional standard drawn from Anderson and Burdick applies in challenges
to voter ID laws, and presumably other barriers to voting. At least
eight and possibly all nine Justices agree on this point.121 Second, a
majority of Justices (those joining the lead opinion and dissents)
agree that courts should balance the character and magnitude of the
burden on voters against the precise interests put forward by the
State.122 For these Justices, the impact of the law on a definable
group of voters is germane to defining its character. Because the
Crawford plaintiffs focused on voter ID’s impact on poor people, that
is the group on which the Justices’ opinions primarily focus. Yet
these opinions leave open the possibility—and the lead opinion
strongly suggests—that the impact on adherents of a non-dominant
political party might also be relevant.
There is a major difference between Crawford and previous cases I
have discussed. Unlike the precedents upon which it relies, Crawford
was based solely on the right to vote under the Equal Protection
Clause, not the right of association under the First Amendment.
Constitutional cases concerning voting barriers since Crawford have
likewise been litigated and decided primarily if not exclusively as
right-to-vote cases. Examples include two cases from Ohio decided
during the 2012 election season. The first case, Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless v. Husted,123 challenged a state rule requiring
the rejection of provisional ballots cast in the correct polling place but
the wrong precinct—often referred to as “right church, wrong pew”
ballots—due to poll worker error. Plaintiffs sought relief under the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed a preliminary injunction requiring that these ballots be counted, focusing its analysis on the
burden Ohio’s rule imposed on voters who are not directed to the

119. Id. at 212, 220.
120. Id. at 237-41 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
121. Justice Breyer may not be in agreement; however, he seems to apply the Anderson-Burdick standard without expressly citing those cases.
122. That majority includes the three Justices signing on to the lead opinion (Justice
Stevens, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justice Kennedy) along with the three dissenters
(Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer). Crawford, 553 U.S. at 181-83.
123. 696 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 2012). The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s preliminary injunction as to provisional ballots with a deficient affirmation. Id. at 599-60.
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correct precinct.124 The other case is Obama for America v. Husted,125
a challenge to Ohio’s rule allowing only military and overseas voters
to use in-person early voting during the last three days prior to the
election. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction in
that case as well, finding that the unequal treatment of voters likely
violated the Equal Protection Clause.126 Both cases were thus litigated as Fourteenth Amendment voting cases, not First Amendment
association cases.
The Sixth Circuit cases are typical of post-Crawford cases challenging state voting rules.127 Plaintiffs have primarily based their
claims on the Equal Protection Clause, sometimes adding a claim
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.128 They
have generally not included First Amendment claims in their complaints. An exception is Veasey v. Perry, a challenge to Texas’ voter
ID requirement in which plaintiffs alleged violations of the First
Amendment as well as the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses
of the Fourteenth Amendment.129 That case, however, is unusual. The
general rule has been for plaintiffs to ground their claims exclusively
on the right to vote and not the right of association—despite the
Supreme Court’s recognition that voting is association protected by
the First Amendment.130
In summary, the Court has long recognized the linkage between
the right to expressive association and the right to vote under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It first recognized that linkage in cases involving minor party and independent
candidates’ access to the ballot, later extending it to cases in which
the dominant major party imposes burdens on the other major party.
124. Id. at 591-99.
125. 697 F.3d 423 (6th Cir. 2012).
126. Id. at 428-36.
127. For citations to some of those cases, see supra notes 3-5.
128. See, e.g., Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2014) (challenging voter ID law
under Equal Protection Clause and Voting Rights Act); Hunter v. Hamilton Co. Bd. of Elections, 635 F.3d 219, 225 (6th Cir. 2011) (challenging disparities in treatment of provisional
ballots on due process and equal protection grounds); N.C. State Conf. NAACP v. McCrory,
2016 WL 204481 (M.D.N.C. 2016) (challenging voter ID law under Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment). But see Veasey v. Abbott, 796 F.3d 487 (5th Cir. 2014)
(asserting equal protection claims, as well as claims under First Amendment, Fifteenth
Amendment, Twenty-Fourth Amendment, and Voting Rights Act).
129. 71 F. Supp. 3d 627, 684-85 (S.D. Tex. 2014). A panel of the Fifth Circuit affirmed
the district court’s injunction against Texas’ law based on section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act, thus allowing it to avoid passing judgment on this constitutional claim. Veasey v.
Abbott, 796 F.3d 487, 493 (5th Cir. 2015). The Fifth Circuit took the case en banc, affirming the district court’s conclusion that the law violated section 2, without reaching the issue whether it imposed an unconstitutional burden under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. Veasey v. Abbott, No. 14-41127, 2016 WL 3923868 (5th Cir. July 20, 2016)
(en banc).
130. See supra pp. 771-75.
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Anderson developed a balancing test for voting-association cases,
subsequently refined in Burdick. In Crawford and subsequent lower
court cases, however, the connection between the right to vote and
the right to expressive association was severed. Constitutional challenges to burdens on voting have mostly been litigated under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not the First
Amendment right of association. The consequence has been to shift
the focus away from the challenged laws’ effects on different subgroups of voters, particularly those defined by party affiliation. Part
IV argues for recovery of the voting-association link.
IV. RECONNECTING VOTING AND ASSOCIATION
Litigants and courts should rekindle the relationship between the
constitutional rights of voting and association. Voting rights lawyers
should allege violations of the First Amendment right of association
in cases challenging burdens on voting such as ID requirements, restrictions on voter registration, and limitations on early voting.
Courts entertaining these cases should focus on the disparate effect
of these practices on different political groups. While disparate effects
on racial groups, people with disabilities, and economic status are
important, political party association is especially important. Accordingly, voting rights lawyers should present proof of a disparate impact on voters inclined to support the non-dominant party, and courts
should consider this evidence in determining whether a given burden
is “discriminatory” in character, thus demanding a higher burden of
justification from the State.
To be clear, I am not arguing for abandonment of the votingassociation doctrine recognized in Williams, defined in Anderson,
clarified in Burdick, and applied to voting burdens in Crawford. I am
instead calling for refinement of that doctrine. The Anderson-Burdick
balancing test effectively captures the need for courts to focus on not
only the “magnitude” of the restriction, but also its “character.” While
magnitude includes both the number of voters affected and the
degree of burden on the individual voter, the character of the burden
includes its discriminatory impact on particular subgroups of voters.
It also captures the necessity of scrutinizing the specific interests
proffered by the State in support of its restrictions, with stronger
interests required to justify greater burdens.
The major problem with the Anderson-Burdick standard, as applied in voting cases since Crawford, is that it’s unclear exactly what
the inquiry into the “character” of the burden should entail. Anderson
explicitly made discrimination relevant to the inquiry, but lower
courts have struggled to figure out what kind of discrimination—
specifically, discrimination against whom—is most significant. Dif-
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ferent plaintiffs and judges have considered the impact on various
groups of voters, including poor people, racial minorities, homeless
people, people with disabilities, and elderly voters. In contrast to the
voting-association cases from which the Anderson-Burdick standard
derives, post-Crawford courts have not looked directly at the challenged practice’s partisan impact.
The primary cost of forgetting the link between voting and association has been to lose focus on political parties. That focus was central to the line of decisions from which the Anderson-Burdick standard emerged. Why should political party be relevant in measuring
the character of a voting restriction? The simple answer is that parties are the primary means through which democratic politics is organized, a reality long recognized by the voting-association cases in
the Anderson line. What these cases have in common is the dominant
party’s adoption of rules that disadvantage voters supporting a nondominant party or faction. Elected officials at the federal and state
level almost always come to office through the nomination of their
political party. Most voters register and vote as members of a party,
while even independent voters tend to align with one major party or
the other on a consistent basis.131 Party identity has become increasingly intense in the current age of hyperpolarized politics, not only
among elected officials but also among voters.132
To be sure, political parties are amorphous and multifarious entities, as political scientists have long understood. Over a half-century
ago, V.O. Key characterized parties as comprising three distinct
groups: the party-in-government, the party leadership, and the partyin-the-electorate.133 Contemporary scholarship recognizes that it is
even more complicated than that. A recent article by Joey Fishkin
and Heather Gerken sums it up nicely: “[A] party today is best understood as a loose coalition of diverse entities, some official and

131. BRUCE E. KEITH ET AL., THE MYTH OF THE INDEPENDENT VOTER 4 (1992); PEW
RESEARCH CTR., POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN THE AMERICAN PUBLIC: HOW INCREASING
IDEOLOGICAL UNIFORMITY AND PARTISAN ANTIPATHY AFFECT POLITICS, COMPROMISE AND
EVERYDAY LIFE 18 (2014), http://www.people-press.org/files/2014/06/6-12-2014-PoliticalPolarization-Release.pdf.
132. There is vast literature on the subject of political polarization in the United
States. For examples, see ALAN I. ABRAMOWITZ, THE DISAPPEARING CENTER: ENGAGED
CITIZENS, POLARIZATION, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2010); Gary C. Jacobson, Party
Polarization in National Politics: The Electoral Connection, in POLARIZED POLITICS:
CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT IN A PARTISAN ERA (Jon R. Bond & Richard Fleisher eds.,
2000); SOLUTIONS TO POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN AMERICA (Nathaniel Persily ed., 2015);
SEAN M. THERIAULT, PARTY POLARIZATION IN CONGRESS (2008); Richard H. Pildes, Why the
Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy in America, 99 CALIF. L.
REV. 273, 276-81 (2011).
133. V.O. KEY, JR., POLITICS, PARTIES, AND PRESSURE GROUPS 163-65 (4th ed. 1958).
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some not, organized around a popular national brand.”134 Now more
than ever, the major political parties are complex and fluid
entities with lots of moving parts. Recognition of this reality does
nothing to diminish the centrality of parties in organizing democratic
politics and defining our political identities as citizens, voters, candidates, and officeholders. While party leadership may be weak, party
attachment is stronger than ever.135
Putting political parties at the center of the constitutional inquiry
is therefore justified under both precedent and present-day reality.
Equally important, a focus on political parties would also best capture the injury that underlies plaintiffs’ claims. The primary reason
for concern with present-day restrictions on voting is that they are
thinly disguised efforts at partisan manipulation, designed to help
the dominant major party at the expense of its main competitor.136
This is true not only of voter ID laws, but also restrictions on voter
registration, early voting, and provisional voting that have since
emerged as major issues. As the district judge in Crawford aptly put
it, “[T]his is a partisan controversy that has spilled into the courts.”
That is an accurate description of Crawford and many of the lower
court cases since then. The lesson is not that courts should shy away
from deciding such cases, but that they should directly address the
partisan effects of the challenged practices. Their failure to do so is a
direct consequence of forgetting the link between voting and
associational rights.
For scholars and students of election law, the suggestion that constitutional litigation should be viewed through the prism of interparty struggles may seem painfully obvious. The backdrop against
which this litigation occurs, after all, is almost always a state’s dominant party enacting rules that make it more difficult for supporters
of the opposing party to vote. Advocates of a “structural” approach to
elections have long focused on barriers to fair competition,137 while
advocates of rights-based approaches also recognize the need for close
judicial scrutiny of party-based discrimination.138 While part of the
backdrop, that is not how these cases have been litigated up until
134. Joseph Fishkin & Heather K. Gerken, The Party’s Over: McCutcheon, Shadow
Parties, and the Future of the Party System, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 175, 187 & n.45 (2014)
(citing literature).
135. Id. at 183, 187.
136. See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Epilogue: Bush v. Gore and the Constitutional Right to Vote 7, 10 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series,
Working Paper No. 13-05, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2227062.
137. The leading example is the influential work of Issacharoff & Pildes, supra
note 101.
138. Richard L. Hasen, Race or Party?: How Courts Should Think About Republican
Efforts to Make It Harder to Vote in North Carolina and Elsewhere, 127 HARV. L. REV. F.
58, 70 (2014).
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now. Litigants and courts have not focused directly on partisan disparate impact. Recognition of the associational rights implicated by
voting cases would allow courts to focus on the real harm, the dominant political party disadvantaging supporters of its main rival.
My colleague Ned Foley has made a similar point, arguing that
the constitutional inquiry should focus on whether voting rules are
efforts at partisan manipulation.139 But Professor Foley suggests that
the Anderson-Burdick balancing be jettisoned entirely, favoring an
approach that would expressly look to whether the challenged practice is “a ploy to achieve partisan advantage.”140 I agree with his
recognition of the underlying problem, though not with his proposed
elimination of the established constitutional standard. Professor Foley’s new test suggests that courts focus on legislature’s partisan intent, while the clarification of the Anderson-Burdick I recommend
would focus on partisan impact. My approach is more consistent with
precedent, specifically the Anderson-Burdick-Crawford line of cases,
which focus on effect rather than an intent to disadvantage political
parties, while avoiding the difficulties that inevitably accompany intent- or purpose-based inquiries.141 It is also more practical. After all,
partisan considerations are always—without exception—in play
when political actors adopt a voting rule. Deciding how much of partisan purpose is too much is an impossible question. Perhaps most
significant, Professor Foley’s proposed standard would put courts in
the uncomfortable position of having to accuse the dominant party of
partisan manipulation to find a constitutional violation. Judges may
occasionally be willing to go out on this limb,142 but it is neither reasonable nor conducive to healthy inter-branch relations to require
that they do so, even if it were a manageable inquiry.
An effects-based balancing standard, moreover, is better calibrated to address the competing interests that are almost invariably in
play in cases involving burdens on the vote. On one side are the negative effects that a given practice will have on voters favoring a nondominant party. The greater the disparate impact on voters affiliated
with the non-dominant party, the stronger the State’s justification
139. Edward B. Foley, Voting Rules and Constitutional Law, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1836, 1861 (2013).
140. Id.
141. For an excellent analysis of the problem in a different context, specifically equal
protection claims inquiring into whether race is the predominant factor in redistricting, see
Daniel Hays Lowenstein, You Don’t Have to Be Liberal to Hate the Racial Gerrymandering
Cases, 50 STAN. L. REV. 779 (1998).
142. A rare example is the dissenting opinion of Judge Evans from the Seventh
Circuit’s decision upholding Indiana’s voter ID law in Crawford v. Marion County Election
Board, 472 F.3d 949, 954 (7th Cir. 2007) (Evans, J., dissenting) (“Let’s not beat around the
bush: The Indiana voter photo ID law is a not-too-thinly-veiled attempt to discourage
election-day turnout by certain folks believed to skew Democratic.”).
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should be. A refined version of the Anderson-Burdick-Crawford
standard—one that puts partisan effects at the center of the analysis—is not only faithful to the voting-association precedents described in Part II, but it does the best job reconciling the competing
interests involved in these cases. Balancing tests invariably involve
some degree of indeterminacy, but not necessarily more than intentbased inquiries. The hard truth is that no bright-line rule will effectively address the concern with dominant parties adopting election
laws that disadvantage their competitors. Any standard, whether
focused on intent or effects, will be dependent on the evidence adduced in discovery and at trial, making it inherently difficult to predict the outcome in advance. That is as it should be. A balancing test
that considers the disparate impact on voters favoring non-dominant
parties will address this concern while taking into account the legitimate competing interests that voting cases implicate.
This is not to deny that other group associations may also be relevant under the Anderson-Burdick balancing standard. Of these, the
most salient is race. That is partly because of the country’s long and
ugly history of racial exclusion, exemplified by the NAACP cases
from which the right of association emerged.143 While not formally a
political party, the NAACP functioned like one in some respects,
challenging the firm grip on power held by the dominant faction, the
all-white Democratic Party. The exclusion of voters based on their
race or ethnicity is not solely of historical concern. As Professor
Charles has documented, race remains central to political identity
today.144 And minority voters, especially African Americans and Latinos, but also Asian Americans, lean strongly Democratic.145 The
Democratic voting preferences of most racial minorities provide a
strong incentive for Republicans, when they control the levers of
power, to improve their own electoral preferences by enacting laws
that disproportionately exclude these groups. It is difficult—and
practically meaningless—to ask whether race or party predominates
where there is a high correlation between the two.146 Elected officials
of one party may very well be pursuing partisan ends by excluding
minority voters who consistently support the other. While this phenomenon may seem most likely when Republicans are in power, it is
at least conceivable that Democrats might also engage in such

143.
144.
145.
146.

See supra notes 24-27, 33-35 and accompanying text.
Charles, supra note 17, at 1232.
Id. at 1233-35; Hasen, supra note 138, at 62.
Hasen, supra note 138, at 61-62.
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exclusion with respect to minority sub-groups that lean Republican.147 Either way, the racially disparate impact of the law is relevant
because it is closely related to its partisan effects.
On this point, I suggest a different emphasis than Professor
Charles, the author of the most comprehensive analysis of the relationship between voting and associational rights to date. While Professor Charles emphasized racial identity as a basis for association,148
I view parties as central because they are the primary associations
through which we organize politically. This is not to deny that racially focused association groups (like the NAACP) are critical at certain
places and times and may play a role very similar to parties. Nor is it
to deny the possibility that the dominant racial group within a political party might try to diminish the clout of a minority racial group
with the same party, warranting judicial intervention. But we no
longer live in a world where racial minorities are excluded from political parties. The racial impact of a law is germane to its partisan intent and effect. In places with a high degree of racial polarization, the
two are likely to be highly correlated. But the primary unit of analysis under the voting-association doctrine upon which this Article is
focused should be party.
How would this play out in practice? The basic framework would
be the same one that lower courts have applied since Crawford, requiring that the “character and magnitude” of the voting restriction
be weighed against the “precise interest” proffered by the State.
Courts would still consider the “magnitude” of the burden, including
the number of voters affected and the degree to which each affected
individual is burdened. The main difference would be an explicit
recognition that a central component of the “character” of the burden
is the impact on members of a non-dominant political party. For a
voting rule adopted by Republicans, courts would look at its negative
effect on Democratic voters; for a rule adopted by Democrats, courts
would look at its negative effect on Republicans.149 This question has
147. For example, Cuban Americans and Vietnamese Americans lean Republican,
although by narrower margins in the last election. See Jens Manuel Krogstad, After Decades of GOP Support, Cubans Shifting Toward the Democratic Party, PEW RESEARCH
CTR. (2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/06/24/after-decades-of-gop-supportcubans-shifting-toward-the-democratic-party/; New Findings: Asian American Vote in 2012
Varied by Ethnic Group and Geographic Location, ASIAN AM. LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND
(Jan. 17, 2013), http://aaldef.org/press-releases/press-release/new-findings-asian-americanvote-in-2012-varied-widely-by-ethnic-group-and-geographic-location.html. It is also possible that Democrats in power might adopt voting practices that disproportionately exclude
whites. Such cases are rare but not unheard of. See United States v. Brown, 561 F.3d 420
(5th Cir. 2009).
148. Charles, supra note 17, at 1231-39, 1279.
149. The latter category may seem less common, but there have been some instances in
which Democrats have been accused of adopting rules that disadvantage Republicans. One
example is Virginia’s treatment of military and overseas voters during the 2008 election,
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lurked in the background in post-Crawford voting rights cases, but
plaintiffs have rarely put forward direct evidence of a disparate impact on voters associated with the non-dominant party. Under the
Anderson-Burdick balancing standard, the larger the partisan disparity, the heavier the State’s burden to justify the disparity. The
analysis of state interests would be the same as under current law
with fraud prevention, voter confidence, and administrative convenience among those that courts should consider. The more severe the
burden—particularly its disparate impact on the non-dominant party—the heavier the State’s burden of justification.
To this point, my consideration has been limited to the effect
that revitalization of the voting-association link would have on election administration litigation. I close with a cautious suggestion
regarding its potential impact on another highly contentious area
of election law: partisan gerrymandering claims. In two cases last
decade, a splintered Supreme Court rejected equal protection claims
alleging excessive partisanship in drawing district lines.150 In Vieth v.
Jubelirer, four Justices would have rejected the claim as a nonjusticiable political question.151 The fifth vote to reject the claim was
Justice Kennedy, who disagreed with the plurality’s reasoning on the
political question issue, but rejected the plaintiffs’ proposed standard
without specifying exactly what standard he thought should govern
partisan gerrymandering claims.152 Justice Kennedy remained agnostic on the constitutional standard in League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry,153 joined on the fence by Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Alito.154
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Vieth contained the intriguing suggestion that the First Amendment might provide a more
promising basis for these claims than the Equal Protection Clause.155
which was challenged by John McCain’s campaign. McCain-Palin 2008 v. Cunningham,
ELECTION LAW @ MORITZ, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/mccain-palinv.
cunningham.php (last updated Mar. 23, 2011, 3:58 PM). Another is an Ohio case from the
same election cycle, in which the Democratic Secretary of State declined to accept certain
absentee ballot requests on a form provided by McCain’s campaign. State ex rel. Myles v.
Brunner, ELECTION LAW @ MORITZ, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/
mylesv.brunner.php (last updated June 29, 2011, 9:54 AM). Plaintiffs obtained relief in
both cases, though not under the U.S. Constitution.
150. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
151. 541 U.S. at 267.
152. Id. at 306-17 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
153. 548 U.S. at 414 (Kennedy, J.).
154. Id. at 492 (Roberts, C.J., joined by Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
155. 541 U.S. at 315; see also Shapiro v. McManus, No. 1:13-cv-03233-JKB, 2016 WL
4445320 (D. Md. Aug. 24, 2016) (three-judge court) (denying motion to dismiss partisan
gerrymandering claim under the First Amendment).
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He specifically mentioned several First Amendment cases burdening
voters on the basis of party association including Anderson, suggesting a “pragmatic or functional assessment that accords some latitude
to states.”156 Commentary on Justice Kennedy’s suggestion has mostly been critical, questioning whether partisan motivations can ever
be excised completely from redistricting.157 But Justice Kennedy’s
Vieth concurrence need not—and I think should not—be understood
as requiring that redistricting be entirely free from partisan considerations any more than the Anderson line of cases requires that
voting rules be entirely free from partisan considerations. He
is better understood as suggesting that future partisan gerrymandering claimants focus on how great a burden the challenged plan
imposes on the opposition, weighing that burden against the State’s
proffered interests. Applying the Anderson-Burdick-Crawford balancing standard in the manner I have suggested here—with a special
eye on the character and magnitude of the burden on non-dominant
parties—might be the best approach to gerrymandering claims as
well as barriers to the right to vote as such.
V. CONCLUSION
For almost a half-century, the Supreme Court has recognized the
link between the First Amendment right to expressive association
and the Fourteenth Amendment right to vote. In the Anderson line of
cases, it transformed this recognition into a manageable doctrine,
requiring courts to balance the burdens imposed by the challenged
practice against the State’s asserted interests. At the heart of this
inquiry is the extent to which the challenged rule has a disproportionate effect on non-dominant political parties and independent
candidates. Crawford imported Anderson’s standard into the realm of
election administration, without expressly recognizing its connection
to the First Amendment right of association. The cost of losing the
voting-association connection is to obscure the central question
whether the challenged voting practice advantages the dominant
party by impeding participation by those likely to support its main
rival. The time has come to restore the severed link between the constitutional rights of voting and association. Doing so would not radi-

156. 541 U.S. at 315-16 (first citing Eu v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S.
214 (1989); then citing Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983)).
157. Richard Briffault, Defining the Constitutional Question in Partisan Gerrymandering, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 397, 407 (2005); Richard H. Pildes, Foreword: The
Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 29, 58 (2004). But see David
Schultz, The Party’s Over: Partisan Gerrymandering and the First Amendment, 36 CAP. U.
L. REV. 1, 30 (2007) (arguing that partisan affiliation should not be considered in
redistricting).
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cally alter the existing constitutional standard, but it would focus
litigants and courts on the right question.

